THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICS: A REPLY
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In the *Psychology of Politics* (11) and in a number of earlier articles and papers the writer has tried to do three things. In the first place, he has tried to construct a dimensional framework to deal with the interrelations obtaining between a wide variety of different social attitudes. The results of several experiments and analyses, carried out in different countries and on different samples, led to the hypothesis that these relationships could be described with considerable accuracy in terms of two orthogonal (independent) factors, labeled radicalism-conservatism (R factor) and tough-mindedness-tender-mindedness (T factor). No attempt was made, as Rokeach and Hanley (16) claim, "to demonstrate that individual differences in social attitudes are reducible to 'two primary social attitudes'"; such a reduction would fail to take account of the specific part of the variance, which is considerable, and could not be effected by the use of the factorial method, on which our conclusions were based.

In the second place, an attempt was made to follow up a hypothesis formulated quite early in the history of this research (5), to the effect that the T dimension was correlated with certain personality variables, while no such correlation was postulated for the R dimension. The specific hypothesis tested was that introverted people would tend to be tender-minded, while extraverted people would tend to be tough-minded. In this connection, the hypothetical constructs "introversion" and "extraversion" are used in terms of the operational definition given them in *Dimensions of Personality* (7), *The Scientific Study of Personality* (9), and *The Structure of Human Personality* (10).

In the third place, an attempt was made to link up both the attitude dimensions and the personality studies with the main body of modern psychology by showing that the results found in our experiments could be deduced from certain postulates of learning theory, and that in this way the particular structuring of variables observed could be explained by reference to a larger body of well-known facts. The claim is made in *The Psychology of Politics* (11) that these three aims have been accomplished to a reasonable approximation. In view of the fact that if this claim could be substantiated the work reported would be of some interest to social psychologists concerned with the integration of their field of study with that of general and experimental psychology, well-considered criticism showing possible weaknesses in the chain of proof is welcomed by the writer, as this would make possible the design of more convincing experiments, or lead to a more accurate restatement of the theory. It is to be regretted that the critique by Rokeach and Hanley (16) does not seem to be related closely enough to the facts of the case to be useful from this point of view.

Their first point of criticism appears to be that in one paper (8) the writer concluded that the communist groups tested had low scores on ten-
under-mindedness; this they claim to be an error based on miscalculation. Computational errors do, of course, occur even when considerable care is taken. The writer does not believe that any such errors occurred in this case, for three reasons. In the first place, computations were done with all the usual checks, and were then repeated independently; identical results were obtained the second time. This does not conclusively eliminate the possibility of computational errors, but makes their occurrence rather less likely.

In the second place, the argument presented by Rokeach and Hanley in favor of their view is a very indirect one, as the published article does not contain enough detail to make accurate computation possible. As they themselves admit, in discussing the "0" responses, "there is only indirect evidence bearing on this point. . . ." It is, in fact, impossible to argue back from the published figures in the way that Rokeach and Hanley are doing, and no rigorous development of their criticism is indeed attempted. When they say of their "recomputations" that "in only two out of eight comparisons are the means identical," it should be clearly understood that this is quite irrelevant as their recomputations leave out part of the data. The fact that the means in two cases are identical is purely fortuitous; there is no reason why any of the means should be identical.

In the third place, Rokeach and Hanley have been very partial in their selection of evidence. They say that "in view of the foregoing analysis, Eysenck's continued contention that communists are more tough-minded than conservatives, liberals, and socialists, is not supported by his published data." Yet in the Psychology of Politics (11, p. 141), there is given a detailed diagram of the scores made by communists and fascists, as compared with a group of matched subjects of conservative, liberal, and socialist attitudes; this diagram bears out completely the conclusion criticized by Rokeach and Hanley. The figures on which it is based, contained in a doctoral dissertation by Coulter (4), were available to at least one of the two critics, and the published diagram gives sufficient detail to show that this independent research substantiates the contention that communists are more tough-minded than people supporting other political parties (with the exception of the fascists). The failure to mention this corroborative evidence is difficult to explain.

Equally important in this connection is another research, completed only recently, and as yet unpublished. This study by Nigniewitzky could not have been known to Rokeach and Hanley, but the results are very relevant to the question of whether the original data can be duplicated in repeated and independent studies. Basing his study on a properly stratified sample of the French population, and using a slightly modified and improved form of the T scale, Nigniewitzky found that communists had a mean score of 10.3; fascists had a mean score of 10.2; communist fellow-travellers had a mean score of 10.2. The mean score of supporters

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1 Even this "indirect evidence" of theirs is based on curious reasoning and factual inaccuracies. Thus Rokeach and Hanley say: "He [Eysenck] always scores "0" responses as tough-minded. . . ." This is quite untrue. Several different scoring schemes have been tried out at various times, such as the one mentioned in the 1947 paper (6, p. 65). The work of Melvin (15) has contributed greatly to a final decision on the best method of dealing with the problem of the "0" response. Any recomputation based on false assumptions of this kind must be regarded as irrelevant.
of all the other main French parties was 17.6! These figures are even more impressive than those found in England; they strongly support our view regarding the position of communists in the two-dimensional factor space.

One further result from Nigneiwitzky's study may be of interest. He found that in an analysis of variance carried out over the main political parties in France, the score on the T dimension gave an even better differentiation than did the R score (in Anglo-Saxon countries the opposite is usually found). Other scales, such as the F scale, which bears considerable similarity to the T scale, and correlates reasonably highly with it in most studies, were very much inferior to both the T and the R scales. These facts, added to those reported in the Psychology of Politics may serve as an adequate comment on Rokeach and Hanley's contention that "tough-mindedness-tender-mindedness," as conceived and measured by Eysenck, has no basis in fact. It is based on miscalculation and a disregard for a significant portion of his data. It conceals rather than reveals the attitudinal differences existing among political groups."

All in all, then, our answer to Rokeach and Hanley is that proper care was observed in the calculation of the data; that their criticism is not based on rigorous calculation, but on argument and surmise; and that two independent repetitions of the study, one of which was known to Rokeach and Hanley, give results even more striking in their support of our hypothesis than did the original study investigated by Rokeach and Hanley.

Allied to the criticism regarding the alleged computational errors is Rokeach and Hanley's discussion of the detailed results of the 1951 paper. They take the writer to task because "in coming to his conclusions (he) makes no reference whatever to these data on the individual items." This is the first time the writer has been criticized for obeying Rule 1.22, Subsection d, of the APA Publication Manual (2), which reads: "Data should be presented no more than once. Although it is appropriate to refer to tabular data in the text of an article, care should be taken not to repeat data unnecessarily in the section on results, in the discussion, and in the summary." The tabular presentation was sufficiently detailed for Rokeach and Hanley to draw conclusions from it at considerable length; no editor would have permitted the writer a discussion of similar length in addition to the tabulation. However, the main point of their discussion indicates that Rokeach and Hanley fail to understand the chief characteristic of dimensional analysis. Communists as a group have loadings on two orthogonal factors; consequently their responses to individual items are determined not only by their tough-mindedness, but also by their radicalism. Items relating to anti-Semitism, war attitudes, the death penalty, and so forth should be answered in the affirmative because of their loading on tough-mindedness.

1 Historically the T scale was published several years before the F scale. The T dimension was isolated in 1944 (5), and the scale published in 1947 (6). The F scale was published in 1950 (1), without mention of the T scale in spite of the obvious similarities. Neither was Ferguson's (13) contribution mentioned, which also is very relevant to the concepts underlying the F scale. Rokeach and Hanley take the author to task because he "did not mention Ferguson's 1941 paper in his original publications on the R and T factors." They omit to add that in an even earlier paper, not quoted by them at all, the writer (5) had thoroughly and in detail discussed the contribution not only of Ferguson (12), but also of Carlson (13), Thurstone (17), and many others.
but in the negative because of their loading with radicalism; the outcome of the ensuing conflict will depend on the respective loadings, as well as on the exact position of each person in the communist group on the two factors. The T score combines in equal proportions radical and conservative items and thus gets rid of the complication introduced by the R factor; in just the same way the R score, combining in equal proportions tough-minded and tender-minded items, gets rid of the complications introduced by the T factor. This point appeared too obvious and indeed elementary to discuss at length in the paper; the reader interested in the detailed construction of the scales, and the problems encountered, may be referred to a separate publication by Melvin (15).

We may now turn to the second major criticism presented. In discussing the similarity between his dimensional scheme and that presented by Ferguson (12, 13), the writer (11, p. 147) has commented that a rotation of 45° would turn the one pair of reference axes (T and R) into the other (humanitarianism and religionism). There is an obvious semantic convenience in employing widely used and accepted terms, such as radicalism-conservatism, particularly when there is evidence that the scale for measuring such a factor coincides with the actual major political party groupings (6). Furthermore, it seems more reasonable to refer to communists as "tough-minded radicals," or to fascists as "tough-minded conservatives," than to refer to conservatives as "religious antihumanitarians," or to socialists as "nonreligious humanitarians," as we would have to do if we accepted the Ferguson scheme. Indeed, this rechristening seems to lead to a reductio ad absurdum when we find Rokeach and Hanley arguing that "communists score the highest on the humanitarian items." To find communists considered as the most "humanitarian" group of all is certainly a little startling!

However, this argument regarding the superiority of the R and T dimensions on the basis of semantic convenience was only used by the author in a very subsidiary way. As pointed out in The Psychology of Politics, in a passage quoted by Rokeach and Hanley, "more convincing would be experimental evidence showing that Tough-mindedness had correlates in other fields, such as, for instance, in the field of personality, which neither Religionism nor Humanitarianism possessed. A proof of this type will be attempted in a later chapter . . . " (11, p. 147). Rokeach and Hanley comment: "Such evidence would indeed be instructive. We made a careful search of the remainder of The Psychology of Politics for this promised experimental test. Our search was in vain. The issue is never again raised in the book." The writer finds this comment difficult to understand. A whole chapter, entitled Ideology and Temperament, is given over to a discussion of the experimental evidence relating to this problem, and several different approaches are reported, all of which support the hypothesis that tough-mindedness and extraversion are related to each other, as required by our hypothesis. The reader's attention is drawn particularly to Figure 30, on p. 178 of The Psychology of Politics, which reports the results obtained by George (14) in a direct attack on this problem. It will be seen there that his measure of extraversion is situated almost exactly on the tough-minded factor axes. Anyone
familiar with dimensional analysis will be able to see for himself the result of rotating the axes through an angle of 45°, thus bringing them in line with the Ferguson system. This would considerably reduce the correlation of extraversion from its present reasonably high size, and would leave us with two rather low and unimportant correlations with religionism (negative) and with humanitarianism (negative). Furthermore, the relation between extraversion and tough-mindedness observed in this study was predicted in terms of theoretical considerations; no such prediction was made to our knowledge with respect to Ferguson’s two factors. Rokeach and Hanley’s failure to see the relevance of this whole chapter, and of this study in particular, to the point in question is difficult to understand.

They also fail to take into account what to the writer is the most important chapter in the whole book, viz., the concluding chapter entitled “A Theory of Political Action.” Here an attempt has been made to deduce the actual structure of attitudes found, as well as the relationship of the T factor to extraversion-introversion, from general learning theory; it was also deduced that there should be no consistent relationship between the R factor and the main personality variables. None of the relations pointed out in this chapter, and none of the deductions made, would be applicable to the Ferguson factors. Rokeach and Hanley do not mention this argument, although to the writer it appears the most cogent one in coming to a decision between the two rival schemes. This failure to come to grips with the writer’s theory as a whole appears to him the outstanding weakness in the critique to which this is the reply. The authors have quite arbitrarily picked out certain isolated points, have disregarded the great mass of evidence supporting each separate conclusion, as well as the interconnections between the different parts of the research under review, and have come to conclusions which are not in fact borne out by a careful perusal of the evidence. The reader will be able to form his own opinion after comparing the facts as outlined in The Psychology of Politics with Rokeach and Hanley’s critique.

REFERENCES


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